Advisories

Netty HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form mistranslated to malformed HTTP/3

Go Back
severity
high
date
Affecting
  • netty >= 4.2.2.Final, < 4.2.18.Final

CWE
  • CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
CVSS
8.7
CVSS V4 Vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Credit
rexpository
Description
Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., "CONNECT trusted.example:443") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to "/", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final.

Ready to get Started?

Explore VulnCheck, a next-generation Cyber Threat Intelligence platform, which provides exploit and vulnerability intelligence to help you prioritize and remediate vulnerabilities that matter.
  • Vulnerability Prioritization
    Prioritize vulnerabilities that matter based on the threat landscape and defer vulnerabilities that don't.
  • Early Warning System
    Real-time alerting of changes in the vulnerability landscape so that you can take action before the attacks start.